Beyond the battlefield: Rethinking defence to integrate biological preparedness

The raising security concerns in the EU are tied to increasingly complex, cross-borders and multidimensional threats - ranging from pandemics and bioterrorism to cyberattacks and conventional warfare. The COVID-19 pandemic was a stark reminder that biological threats can be as disruptive as traditional military ones, and that public health resilience must be considered a core component of national and European security strategies. Unsurprisingly, the notions of biodefence and biosecurity are becoming more prominent in the EU policy rhetoric. However, while the EU has made notable progress in strengthening medical preparedness, through initiatives such as the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA), rescEU and, earlier in the 2025, the EU Preparedness Union Strategy and the EU Stockpiling Strategy, defence and public health efforts remain largely siloed. As a result, from a governance standpoint, leadership and responsibilities around biological preparedness are unclear both at national and EU levels.   

In the current volatile geopolitical landscape, defence spending is on the rise. National and EU budgets are being shaped around military readiness, often without a structured approach to integrating health-related threats into defence planning. Instead, biodefence seems to fall under the broad umbrella of total defence spending, with a general EU focus on increasing overall defence capabilities, through instruments like the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the ReArm Europe Plan, without detailed funding pathways. In parallel, in June 2025, NATO allies set unprecedented budget targets, namely 3.5% of GDP for core defence requirements and 1.5% of GDP earmarked for defence-related infrastructure, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, civil preparedness, resilience, and strengthening the defence industrial base. However, uncertainties remain as to which budget line will fund biological countermeasures, whether civilian and military preparedness should draw from the same source, and how to define the specific requirements for civilian and military products in this context. 

Beyond the general recognition that, nowadays, biological preparedness must be viewed not only as a health crisis policy issue, but as a strategic security imperative, a number of questions arise:  

• What are the main gaps between public health preparedness and traditional defence planning, and how can they be bridged? 
• In terms of bridging the civil-military gap, what can be learned from countries that have taken a “total defence” approach?  
• How can biological threats be more effectively addressed in national and EU security strategies and budgets?  
• What role should the military play in supporting biological threat preparedness and response, in line with civilian leadership in public health? Should the military be prepared in coordination with the general public, or should this be considered two separate initiatives? 
• How can dual-use infrastructures and technologies be governed and funded to serve both defence and medical countermeasures goals? 
• What role can industry and public-private partnerships play in supporting an integrated civil-military European preparedness framework? 
• What mechanisms are needed to set up a coherent policy framework for biosecurity that ensures a coordinated approach among public services for defence, health, and interior affairs at the national and EU levels? 

On 4 December 2025, Science|Business, in partnership with Emergent, will convene a selected group of key stakeholders from public health, medical preparedness, civil protection, defence, and security sectors to explore how Europe can better integrate biological preparedness into its defence and security agenda. This closed-door roundtable will aim to identify policy, governance, funding and operational pathways to foster a more coordinated European approach to crisis preparedness.