Viewpoint: it’s time to fix the Framework planning system

For nearly three decades, I have laboured on EU research and innovation policy. Much as I have loved the work, I have to say: the system is not functioning as well as it should.

In brief, we have a problem of governance, not of talent or ambition. Too often, I have seen the initial plans for a new, multi-year Framework Programme launched with high hopes, only to be muddied by a political process that too often produces fragmentation, inflexibility and inefficiency. My view isn’t unique among Framework insiders. But I do have a few suggestions.

First, so you know why I say this, a word about me. I have worked on Framework negotiations since 1997, whether for the Swedish government or universities, or inside the European Commission itself. From many angles, I have seen how Framework Programmes are conceived, negotiated and implemented. I have seen where the system works less well than intended. And, alas, I have seen a recurring pattern.

What doesn’t work

Commission proposals typically start from a coherent strategic vision. My view has always been that the Framework Programme is not a research programme but a political instrument for which research is needed. The aim of the Commission proposal is to balance excellence, impact, openness and long-term European political priorities. These goals are internally consistent and designed with implementation feasibility in mind.

During the ensuing political negotiations, however, this coherence often weakens. In the EU Council, member states naturally prioritise their own national interests, budgetary returns or thematic preferences. This is not a moral failing; it is a structural feature of the system. National governments are politically accountable at home and are therefore incentivised, indeed obliged, to defend national priorities in Brussels.

In the European Parliament, amendments may reflect political signalling or constituency-driven priorities. Individually, these inputs are understandable; collectively, they often lead to increased complexity, fragmentation and rigidity.

Sweden is not exempt from this process. Its national priorities, such as forestry and inland waters, have been included in every Framework Programme since FP5. However, as each member state pursues its own priorities, the overall focus gradually becomes more diluted, without a corresponding increase in budget. The result is more priorities, less funding per priority, low success rates and a spreading of resources.

The outcome is a Framework Programme that is more detailed, more prescriptive and less flexible than originally intended. This, in turn, complicates implementation, reduces the Commission’s ability to adapt to new developments and constrains Europe’s capacity to respond to unforeseen challenges, whether pandemics, technological breakthroughs or geopolitical shocks.

Horizon 2020 illustrates this dynamic clearly. While the Commission proposed a coherent and flexible framework, subsequent negotiations in the Council and Parliament introduced binding participation targets, thematic specification within “societal challenges,” quantitative mainstreaming requirements and expanded cohesion measures financed from within the programme. 

Individually justified, these additions collectively reduced flexibility, spread resources more thinly and constrained the Commission’s ability to adapt priorities during implementation. A simple indicator of the problem: the final agreement in 2013 had about twice as many pages as the 2011 Commission proposal, and even that outcome took more than two years of complex negotiation. A similar tendency, and even more protracted negotiations, were observed in setting up the current programme, Horizon Europe.

Now, in pointing out this problem, I am not arguing against democratic scrutiny. Rather, I see a structural issue in how EU democracy is organised.

Responsibilities are spread across multiple institutions, decision-making is layered and political ownership becomes diluted. For citizens and stakeholders alike, it is often unclear who is ultimately responsible for strategic choices, or who should be held accountable for success or failure. Paradoxically, it is the member states that nominate commissioners; yet collective trust in their executive role often weakens once they are in office. Positive outcomes in Brussels are frequently claimed at national level, while responsibility for failures is attributed to “Brussels.”

A quick fix: empower the Commission

For all this, there is a short-term solution: greater trust in the Commission’s executive role. The Commission already drafts proposals, manages programmes and is accountable to the European Parliament. Yet in research and innovation policy, it is frequently subject to extensive ex ante constraints, detailed earmarking and micro-management through programme design and budget negotiations.

Within the existing EU treaties, there is already significant scope for improvement. Research is an area of shared competence, giving the Union room to act, even though fields such as health and education remain primarily national. The challenge is therefore not legal incapacity, but how effectively existing competences are used.

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For the next Framework Programme and the planned European Competitiveness Fund to succeed, the Commission needs sufficient room to manoeuvre within a clear political mandate. This does not mean reducing accountability. On the contrary, clearer responsibility combined with strong ex post scrutiny would strengthen democratic control while improving effectiveness.

The discussion on the next EU budget plan, the Multiannual Financial Framework to run from 2028 to 2034, illustrates this tension clearly. While long-term financial planning is indispensable, negotiating highly detailed priorities ten years in advance risks locking the EU into outdated assumptions. 

For instance, the European Competitiveness Fund is intended to enhance strategic focus and flexibility. Whether it succeeds will depend not only on its objectives, but on the governance framework in which it operates. If flexibility is curtailed through overly prescriptive rules or political compromises, new instruments risk reproducing existing problems.

Research and innovation policy must be able to evolve alongside scientific progress, market dynamics and geopolitical realities. Governance arrangements should enable, not constrain, this evolution.

The long game: aligning EU governance with democratic logic

In the longer term, improving EU research and innovation policy requires not only better instruments, but a clearer and more comprehensible governance model.

At national level, democratic systems follow a well-understood logic: citizens elect a parliament; a government is formed; that government proposes policy; parliament scrutinises, improves and adopts it. Over time, this clarity of responsibility has proven essential for both effectiveness and democratic trust. My proposal is to apply the same logic at EU level.

Any reform debate must also recognise the different categories of EU competence set out in the EU treaties: exclusive, shared and supporting competences. Research is an area of shared competence, while fields such as health and education remain primarily national. These constitutional limits shape what reform can realistically achieve.

European Parliament elections should directly lead to the formation of a new European Commission, acting as the EU’s executive “government.” On the basis of this electoral mandate, the Commission would be responsible for proposing policy, including major initiatives in research and innovation. The European Parliament would then exercise its democratic role by scrutinising, improving and adopting these proposals.

Any such reform would need to respect the balance between large and small member states, while preserving a strong and well-defined advisory structure involving industry, universities and other stakeholders through open consultation. If European Parliament elections are to shape executive leadership, political debate must also increasingly take place at European rather than purely national level.

In such a system, the role of the EU Council would need to be reconsidered. Much of the detailed legislative work currently undertaken in Council working groups could be reduced or abolished, limiting duplication and complexity. The Council would remain the forum for setting overall political direction, with additional Council structures retained only where clearly necessary, such as in defence and security policy.

This model would not weaken democracy. On the contrary, it would clarify political responsibility, strengthen the link between elections and policy outcomes, and make accountability more visible to citizens. For EU research and innovation policy, it would also create the flexibility and responsiveness needed to address rapidly evolving scientific, technological and geopolitical challenges.

Dan Andrée is senior advisor and Brussels representative of the University Alliance Stockholm Trio, which brings together the Karolinska Institutet, KTH Royal Institute of Technology and Stockholm University. The views expressed are the author’s own.